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ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT LAW
Lee Petherbridge*
There is little dispute over what Congress believed it was doing to
patent law when it established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Centralizing appellate jurisdiction for patent law was
meant to address the widespread perception that the legal
infrastructure of patent law was not well managed by the conventional
arrangement of regional circuits supervised by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The new court, it was thought, would better manage and develop patent
law, thereby producing improvements in the uniformity and coherency
of the law. This Article examines central features of patent law that the
Federal Circuit is conventionally credited with developing-
specifically, doctrines of patentability and patent scope-against the
background of the court's institutional position in the patent system.
From that perspective, the Article explains how the Federal Circuit,
while perhaps not perfectly, has moved to rationalize patent law with
patent policy and theory.
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Thanks to Judge S. Jay Plager,
David Schwartz, Kimberly West-Faulcon, Ted Sichelman, Richard Gruner, Kelly Mullally, and
the many scholars and participants at the symposium: The Federal Circuit as an Institution, for
their helpful comments and insights. Credit is also due the students of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for the excellent decision to host a symposium on this important topic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
established in response to a number of policy concerns that had
become especially pressing by the 1970s.' The federal courts
generally were facing an explosion of litigation.2 The nation was
experiencing a remarkable decline in industrial innovation and
economic growth, while simultaneously experiencing double-digit
inflation and high unemployment.' A Carter administration domestic
policy review suggested that one policy approach to relieving the
nation's "malaise" was to encourage innovation.' But existing studies
suggested that innovation was impeded by a lack of uniformity in the
application of patent law.' There developed a widespread perception
that the legal infrastructure of patent law was not well managed by
the conventional arrangement of regional circuits supervised by the
U.S. Supreme Court.'
By passing the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,' and
thereby creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Congress intended to bring consistency to patent law and restore the
incentive for industrial innovation.' The Act centralized jurisdiction
over patent appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
("Patent Office" or "Office"), the U.S. District Courts, the Court of
1. See generally THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A
HISTORY 1982-1990 1-14 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 2002) [hereinafter FEDERAL CIRCUIT
HISTORY] (chronicling the economic and political circumstances surrounding the creation of the
Federal Circuit); see S. REP. NO. 97-275 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11; H.R. REP.
No. 97-312 (1981); Charles W. Adams, The Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than
a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. REv. 43 (1984) (discussing the background and formation of
the Federal Circuit); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989) (same); Donald R. Dunner, The US. Court ofAppeals for the
Federal Circuit: Its Critical Role in the Revitalization of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past,
Present, and Future, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 775, 776-78 (2010) (same).
2. FEDERAL CIRCUIT HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2-3.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id.
5. Adams, supra note 1, at 55-57; Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 7; see also S. REP. NO. 97-
275; H.R. REP. No. 97-312 (1981).
6. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 6 ("Perhaps because of its own docket problems and its lack of
expertise, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed the patent law decisions of the regional circuits.
The resulting lack of national guidance created a microcosm of. . . difficulties.").
7. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 9-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
8. FEDERAL CIRCUIT HISTORY, supra note 1, at 12.
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Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade in a single
appellate court. As Congress saw it, centralizing jurisdiction for
patent appeals should have at least two salutary effects: (1) it should
enable the newly created court to manage and develop patent law and
(2) it should promote better patent law with improved doctrinal
coherence and stability.'
Since the creation of the Federal Circuit, the United States has
experienced a period of innovation considered by some to be
exceptionally impressive. Nonetheless, the ambivalence present at
the establishment of the court has persisted in some circles. While
there is no shortage of commentators who report that Congress's
experiment has had considerable success," there is also no shortage
of those who are willing to vociferously proclaim their
dissatisfaction with modem patent law."
This Article approaches the question of how well the Federal
Circuit has handled the development of patent law by examining
central features of patent law that the Federal Circuit is
conventionally credited with developing. 2 Specifically, this Article
considers developments in the doctrines of patentability and patent
scope, against the background of the court's institutional position in
the patent system. The overall suggestion of the analysis is that the
Federal Circuit, while perhaps not perfectly, has moved to rationalize
patent law with patent policy and theory.
9. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical
Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1115-16 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Gerald Mossinghoff, The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW 31, 31-32 (4th ed. 2008); Marcia Coyle, Critics Target the Federal Circuit, 29
NAT'L L.J. 1 (2006); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment
in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 769, 770-71 (2004) (reporting practitioner views);
Dunner, supra note 1, at 9 ("The bottom line at the conclusion of the first quarter century of the
court's existence is that the court has more than delighted its early proponents and surprised its
opponents with its high level of performance.").
11. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619 (2007) (criticizing the court's doctrinal development). But
see S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle: A
Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1735 (2007) (challenging a number of points
and premises upon which Nard and Duffy rely).
12. As the relevant discussions explain, most of these doctrines did not originate with the
Federal Circuit. Nonetheless, the court is still conventionally credited (and by some criticized)
with amplifying the doctrines' significance and helping the law achieve its current state of
development. It should also be clear that the Federal Circuit has worked with the infrastructure of
patent law in areas that are not discussed in this Article.
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Part II of the Article furnishes the theoretical framework against
which the court's performance will be compared. Part III.A considers
patentability" from the perspective of the law of obviousness. This
part explains that the concept underlying the law of obviousness
imposes substantial limitations on the legal determinatenessl 4 its
doctrinal rules should be expected to provide. It then examines the
Federal Circuit's central contribution to this area of law: the
development of a requirement that a determination of obviousness be
accompanied by a rationale explaining why a person of ordinary skill
in the art would find a patent claim to be obvious. This part then
explains why this development can be understood as rationalizing
patent law with patent policy and theory. It concludes with the
observation that the requirement of an explanatory rationale has a
largely unappreciated potential future benefit: it may encourage the
future development of the legal part of the obviousness question."
Part III.B.1 considers patent scope from the perspective of the
doctrine of equivalents.'" After introducing the doctrine, this part
explains how the doctrine of equivalents has developed to rationalize
the way the law addresses information externalities associated with
the patent-granting process, thereby seeking to encourage policy
favoring good public notice of patent rights. Part III.B.2 considers
patent scope from the perspective of claim construction." The
analysis here acknowledges that the Federal Circuit has pursued
innovation in the law that guides claim construction, and notes that
the court's innovation can be understood as moving to rationalize
patent law with patent policy and theory. But the analysis also
explains that the court seems recently to have abandoned innovation
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. As used in this Article, "legal determinateness" means the capacity of the rules of the
law when confronted with a claim to a new invention to conclusively settle patentability-
without the need to resort to a costly inquiry into easily disputable factual conclusions. See infra
note 51.
15. The formal structure of obviousness is a very thin legal question sitting atop a costly,
heavily factual inquiry. The relevant section speculates that the Federal Circuit's work in this area
creates an environment for thickening-increasing the decisional significance of-the legal
question. This might someday lead to obviousness determinations that need rely less heavily on
genuinely disputable factual conclusions.
16. See infra Part III.B.t.
17. See infra Part III.B.2.
897Spring 2010]
898 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.43:893
in this area in a way that might indicate a derationalization of patent
law. The Article finishes with a brief conclusion.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Introduction provides the theory of the Federal Circuit-
developer of a better patent law-against which the court's
performance will be considered in the remainder of this Article.
However, the observations presented in this Article rely heavily on
two additional theoretical foundations. As I describe in more detail
below, the first is a fairly conventional-but perhaps not universally
agreed upon-view of the incentives provided by patent law. The
second is a theory of the patent-granting process and of the costs that
process imposes on the patent system.
A. Theory ofPatents
Patent law is just one part of a large and complex system of
incentives and disincentives that, by making benefits possible and
imposing costs, affect innovation and competition. In very general
terms, patent law is a collection of rules that create a form of
property," exclusive rights" enforceable against others in the
jurisdiction, with the traditional remedies for infringement including
damages for past infringement and an injunction20 prohibiting future
infringing acts.
18. A point about which the Supreme Court and Congress have been explicit. 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1) (2006) ("Every Patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling . . . or importing the
invention . . . ."); id. § 261 ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes
of personal property."); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637,
643 (1947) (reversing a determination that a patent licensing agreement violated antitrust laws
and stating, "A patent is a species of property. It gives the patentee or his assignee the 'exclusive
right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery' for a limited period."); Consol. Fruit-Jar
Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) (affirming a determination of invalidity and stating, "A
patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same
foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions. There is a like larger domain
held in ownership by the public. Neither an individual nor the public can trench upon or
appropriate what belongs to the other.").
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (reflecting that delegates to the 1787 Constitutional
Convention agreed that the U.S. Congress should have the power to impose a patent system to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing ... to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right to their .. . Discoveries").
20. Patent law, like all property systems, substitutes other remedies in certain cases. The use
of substitute remedies may become more pronounced after eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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Within the milieu of innovation and competition, the rights
furnished by patent law are generally understood to provide a
number of discrete incentives. The exact content of the list of
incentives, as well as the relative social importance of each, is a
matter of continuing debate. However, the following incentives are
likely to be found on any conventional21 list: The incentive to
invent-the idea that patent law encourages the creation of
inventions; the incentive to disclose-the idea that patent law
encourages public accessibility to information about inventions by
publication of the patent document, and, in some instances, by
encouraging public practice of embodiments of an invention; the
incentive to design around (or follow on)-the idea that once an
invention and its attendant rights are made known to the public,
others will be encouraged to build on it to make noninfringing or,
perhaps, infringing improvements; and the incentive to
commercialize 22-the idea that knowledge of an invention and its
attendant rights encourages parties to invest in acquiring the control
necessary to develop and market products embodying the invention.
This Article adopts the understanding that the rights made
available through patent law are generally capable of providing these
incentives. It is also worth emphasizing that the concepts of the
latter two incentives-the incentive to design around and the
incentive to commercialize-include the principle that public notice
of an invention and its attendant rights is crucially important. 24 The
basic idea is that more predictable rights can make innovation more
efficient. Good public notice helps to channel investment away from
21. KIEFF ET AL., THE PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 65-71 (4th ed.
2008).
22. Similar concepts are known under the labels "incentive to invest" and "incentive to
innovate."
23. To be clear, the theory described here does not maintain that patent rights provide these
incentives in every case. Nor does it maintain that changes to patent law implemented to
encourage the benefits of one incentive will necessarily have the effect of encouraging the
benefits of another incentive. Doctrinal changes focused on encouraging the benefits of once
incentive might leave remaining incentives unaffected, or might diminish the benefits possible
through another inventive.
24. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002) ("The patent laws 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' by rewarding
innovation with a temporary monopoly. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The monopoly is a property
right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation.").
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duplicative projects and encourages investment and deal making
around patented subject matter.
Finally, the Article adopts the understanding that claims to
inventions that meet or exceed the substantive statutory requirements
for patenting are those that, as a normative policy matter, should be
granted.
B. Theory of the Patent-Granting Process
In the patent system, the responsibilities of the Patent Office and
of the courts might be thus summarized: The Patent Office receives
applications for patents. It examines claims of invention made in
applications to ensure that they meet or exceed the legal
requirements that define when a patent should issue. In cases in
which claims do not, the Office denies them. In cases in which they
do, the Office allows them, and they normally issue as part of a
patent. Overall, the Patent Office grants patents in substantial
numbers.26
Courts, on the other hand, are tasked with determining the legal
scope of the rights conferred by patent claims and with determining
whether accused products and processes infringe those rights. These
tasks are confronted in patent litigation, a context in which some
interested party (often an accused or potential infringer) may also
contend that the subject patent claim or claims never should have
issued. In those cases, courts are also called upon to review the legal
and factual correctness of the Patent Office's decision to grant a
patent.27
This simple structural description of the role of the Patent Office
and of the courts elides entirely a number of gritty, but important,
25. To be sure, courts help define what statutes mean and so there is the risk of some degree
of circularity in this construct. To be clear the construct is adopted to exclude other (nonstatutory)
normative preferences for what it should take to get a patent either generally, or with respect to
particular subject matter. It thus serves to adopt the statutory standards as the proper target for
judge-developed doctrine.
26. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 181-82 (2008). See generally Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing
Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J.
1 (2001) (discussing and analyzing grant rates in USPTO from 1981 through 2001); Cecil D.
Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office-Updated, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 635 (2006) (same through 2005).
27. Courts-primarily but not exclusively the Federal Circuit-also review Patent Office
refusals to issue a patent.
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details of not only the process of patent-granting but also the costs
the patent-granting process imposes on the patent system. To begin
with, the Patent Office's examination of claims of invention in patent
applications is intended to be nothing more than "a rough 'first cut'
at determining [the] validity" of the claims. 28 To be clear about it, the
Patent Office's limited evaluation of applications, even if not
precisely as designed, is probably sensible in a larger context. Very
few patents have real marketplace value,29 in the sense that they are
ever licensed or asserted against a competitor. Accordingly, making
a substantial expenditure to perform a detailed examination of the
claims of any individual patent application is (probabilistically) akin
to making a substantial expenditure to shine up trash." Limiting
these sorts of expenditures can, therefore, be understood theoretically
as fairly sound social judgment.
The Patent Office's limited evaluation of patent applications,
however, has consequences. First, it probably means that the Patent
Office allows a nontrivial number of claims directed to inventions
that are unpatentable. It probably also means that the Patent Office
rejects a nontrivial number of claims directed to inventions that are
(or should be) patentable. There are social costs-in terms of
efficiency of innovation and competition-to both of these events.3 1
Second, the Patent Office's limited evaluation of claims amplifies the
impact of strong incentives for patentees to seek, and for the Patent
Office to issue, patents with claims that do not meet the statutory
28. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1046-47 (4th ed. 2007).
29. This view is based on the best available information, and is fairly conventional. See
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 80-83 (2005);
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2005).
Some potentially contradictory information exists, however. See Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STANFORD L. REv. 341, 362-63 (citing surveys reporting roughly
50 percent commercialization rates).
30. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1497 (2001) ("In short, the PTO doesn't do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we
probably don't want it to. It is 'rationally ignorant' of the objective validity of patents, in
economics lingo, because it is too costly for the PTO to discover those facts.").
3 1. In general terms they are fairly obvious. Claims directed to inventions that should not
have been patented will occasionally impose costs on competitors and will usually impose
opportunity cost losses on the patentees who have secured invalid patents. Failing to grant patents
to deserving inventions diminishes the incentive to commercialize important innovations and
discourages future research efforts.
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requirements for patenting.3 2 Those incentives have recently been
laid bare by Professor R. Polk Wagner, whose recent work
"Understanding Patent Quality Mechanisms" explains why patentees
have very strong incentives to draft patent applications that obscure
the scope of the claims they contain, why the Patent Office has
strong incentives to effectively cooperate with this patenting strategy
by conducting ineffective examinations, and why these behaviors are
largely self-reinforcing.
Patentees are inspired to obscure the scope of claims and the
relationship of claims to prior art (which may be limiting or
invalidating) for some very straightforward reasons.3 Patent
prosecution (the process of patent acquisition) normally takes years,
and suits involving patents may happen years after a patent issues.
Patent applicants must therefore seek to predict the future, to predict
among other things the forms of embodiments competitors seeking to
avoid infringement might someday use to practice the principles of
an invention. In seeking to account for this eventuality, however,
patent applicants must still seek to avoid the impact of prior art.
One well-recognized way of addressing the problem-of being
broad enough to capture future developments, while narrow enough
to avoid prior art-is to seek interpretive flexibility. If it can be
achieved, it may allow a patentee to suggest a narrow understanding
of its claims at the Patent Office and later adjust its arguments about
claim meaning to meet competitors' products or services. Perhaps the
most obvious way to achieve interpretive flexibility is to seek
vagueness when claiming and describing an invention. The use of
vague claims increases flexibility because vagueness can enable
various arguments for the meaning of claim terms-arguments that
might be precluded if claims are drafted to be clear and definite.
Avoiding detailed descriptions of embodiments complements this
32. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2135, 2138 (2008) (defining low-quality patents as those directed to inventions that do not meet
"the statutory standards for patentability-most importantly, to be novel, nonobvious, and clearly
and sufficiently described").
33. See id. at 2145-58; see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process,
and Patent Law, 43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 1109, 1135-42 (2010) (describing additional
incentives affecting private actors that encourage patent claims of uncertain scope).
34. See Wagner, supra note 32, at 2148-51 (discussing the reasons).
902
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approach by diminishing the power of courts to use the descriptive
part of the patent document to limit the legal scope of patent claims.
It is important to point out that these behaviors are entirely
rational to patent applicants. Indeed, it is somewhat hard to fault
applicants who approach the patent-granting process with this
perspective. A patent claim that can be valuably enforced against a
competitor is a rare thing: patents provide probabilistic rights, and
the probabilities that have to be overcome to obtain the valuable
enforcement of a patent seem to increase with regularity.3 5 Not only
must a patentee actually have the necessary patents at the right time,
it must also get a court to buy into a proffered claim construction and
avoid the many theories available to invalidate a patent claim or
make the patent unenforceable; if it successfully overcomes those
hurdles, it must succeed in obtaining a remedy that justifies the
acquisition and enforcement of the patent.3 6
When patentee incentives are combined with Patent Office
incentives that encourage collaboration in the strategy of using vague
claims and vague descriptions,3 7 the patent-granting process imposes
remarkable information costs on the patent system.38 While
patentability is difficult enough to measure, its measurement
35. See Mullally, supra note 33, at 1130-33 (describing recent Supreme Court caselaw that
has enhanced the uncertainty of patent law).
36. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (creating uncertainty in
the remedy available when patents are infringed and not invalid).
37. The incentives come from several different sources. As noted earlier, the patent-granting
process is in practice unlikely to turn out good, clean, likely-to-be-valid patents. It is just a rough
first cut. In addition, as has been chronicled by a number of commentators, the Patent Office has
very limited resources yet faces a seemingly ever-increasing number of patent applications. The
result is a number of pending applications that dwarfs the number of new applications each year,
and reports suggest that examiners have a discouragingly low number of hours to spend with the
mean patent application. Nonetheless, grants increase. In addition, the Patent Office exists to
grant at least some number of patents and may have cultural incentives to regularly grant patents.
From a more austere perspective, examiners are economically encouraged to allow patents
because they are evaluated on production counts, which can be obtained by allowing patents to
issue. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 32, at 2151-52 (describing these and other incentives).
38. Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 172, 181-84 (2005) (discussing
information costs around patent prosecution); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action
in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 312-17
(explaining that information may affect Patent Office work product); R. Polk Wagner,
Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 159
(2002) (discussing prosecution externalities). For a theoretical treatment of information costs and
intellectual property, including patents, see Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REv. 465 (2004).
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becomes even harder-approaching complete spuriousness-when
the measurer cannot comprehend the claim of invention being
measured. Moreover, the information costs imposed on the patent
system by this set of incentives spill well beyond the patent-granting
process. Competitors and patentees both will have difficulty
assessing the scope and enforceability of claims in granted patents.
Uncertainty of this sort can make business decisions involving
patents more costly and can encourage litigation that may be
unnecessary. In view of the way that the patent system is believed to
provide much of its benefit-through incentives that rely on the
principle that decent public notice of an invention and its attendant
rights are important-the information costs imposed by the patent-
granting process are troubling.
In sum, the theoretical framework of the patent-granting process
deployed in this Article includes four central ideas: First, relatively
few patents are commercially relevant. Second, the Patent Office
issues nontrivial numbers of patents that it should not because the
claims of the patents are not likely to satisfy one or more of the
substantive requirements for patenting. Errors of this sort, or the
reverse, (i.e., refusing to issue patents for deserving claims), impose
costs that can reduce the efficiency of innovation and competition.
Third, patent applicants have significant incentives to be vague in
claiming and describing inventions. Fourth, the Patent Office has
strong incentives to collaborate with applicants' vagueness-seeking
strategies. The end result is that cooperatively patent applicants and
the Patent Office can discourage good public notice of patent rights,
and thereby impose significant information costs on the patent
system.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS MOVED TO RATIONALIZE
PATENT LAW WITH PATENT POLICY AND THEORY
Relying on two central areas of patent law, this part develops the
explanation for how the Federal Circuit has moved to rationalize
patent law with patent policy and theory. The central areas of patent
law that serve as the basis for this discussion are the doctrinal areas
of patentability and patent scope. The central theme of this part is
that the Federal Circuit's work in these important areas of the law
904
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can be understood3 9 as respecting basic policies and theories of patent
law, as accounting for well-recognized limitations of PTO practice,
and in at least some cases as leaving the law in a position to continue
to develop in response to a changing technological future.
A. The Federal Circuit and Patentability
This section introduces patentability-the law of obviousness.
After introducing the basic principles of the law, it points out that
Justice Woodbury's prediction over 150 years ago that the law
"seems open to great looseness or uncertainty in practice"40 has
largely been validated. After considering some reasons for why the
principle underlying obviousness might defy rules that hope to
substantially enhance its legal determinateness, this section
introduces a development in the law of obviousness normally
associated with the involvement of the Federal Circuit. It proceeds to
explain how this development rationalizes the law by: (a) helping to
impose obviousness policy; (b) promoting accuracy and certainty,
and respecting measurement cost concerns; and (c) potentially
working as an incubator for improvements to the law-particularly
improvements that might increase determinateness.
Patent law establishes a number of substantive requirements that
must be satisfied for a patent to issue. For example, an invention
must be the kind of thing that can be patented (i.e., it has to be
patentable subject matter),4 1 it must also be useful,4 2 be properly
disclosed in the patent specification,43 be new44 in the sense that it has
not been previously possessed by the public, and be nonobvious.45
39. The caveat implied here is, I think, fairly obvious. This part seeks to show that what the
court has done can be understood-in view of the framing provided-as a rational response to a
number of generally agreed upon features of the modem patent system. It makes no claim that the
Federal Circuit's performance has been "perfect" or that it has "optimized" the incentives and
disincentives that the rule choices provide. Nor does it endeavor to confront how the explanations
might change if the framing were to change-if, for example, extrinsic empirical assumptions or
information were brought to bear.
40. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 270 (1850) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
41. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102, 103(a), 112 (2006). See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding a live human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter); In
re Bilski 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009) (holding a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities trading is not patentable
subject matter).
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
43. Id. § 112.
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While all of these requirements are necessary to have a valid and
enforceable patent, the common refrain is that nonobviousness is the
"ultimate condition of patentability." 46 The other main prior art
limitations-novelty and the statutory bars-seek to assess whether a
single piece of prior art, such as a scientific article, or a prior patent,
discloses either expressly or inherently an invention identical to the
one sought by a patent applicant. While the novelty and statutory bar
provisions are not always easy to apply, they are understood to
present questions that can often be reasonably determined.
In contrast to the novelty and statutory bar provisions, the basic
policy of obviousness is that advances not apparent to an ordinarily
skilled artisan-armed with all manner of relevant prior art-are
those that advance human understanding sufficiently to justify the
grant of a patent. Thus, even truly novel inventions will be denied a
patent if they are deemed to have been within the reach of a person
of ordinary skill in the art. The relevant goal of this policy, stated in
terms of patent theory, is to set the level of innovation at a place
where the costs and benefits-the incentives-thought to flow from
the granting of patents are well aligned.47
1. The Limitations of Obviousness
As noted above, the basic policy of obviousness is that advances
not apparent to an ordinarily skilled artisan are those that advance
human understanding sufficiently to justify the grant of a patent.
While the concept is simple enough to state, it has proven
tremendously difficult to operationalize. Nearly one hundred years
after Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the case usually credited with
introducing the doctrine,4 8 Judge Learned Hand, a noted patent jurist,
44. See id. § 102 (establishing the novelty and statutory bars).
45. See id. § 103(a) (making an invention unpatentable "if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains").
46. See, e.g., NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980).
47. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Uncertainty and Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992)
(describing how the obviousness standard helps measure risk taking in innovation).
48. The Supreme Court claims to have invented the now-statutory standard in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 248-49, 253-54 (1850). See Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) ("We have concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to codify
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described the doctrine as being "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward,
and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal
concepts."4 9 And eventually, as the Supreme Court continued to
struggle to provide an operationally useful definition of the concept,
Congress interrupted roughly one hundred years of judicial effort by
codifying the requirement for the first time in the 1952 Patent Act,
which makes an invention unpatentable if it was "obvious at the time
[it] was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains."50
In terms of legal determinateness," the law of obviousness has
not advanced too far beyond its basic concept, which is largely stated
by the statute.52 There are several probable reasons for this. The
first-and maybe most pronounced-is the nature of the question
itself. The measurement cost of obviousness is tremendous." Recall
that the policy of obviousness is that patents should be granted for
judicial precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (1851), and that, while the clear language of section 103 places
emphasis on an inquiry into obviousness, the general level of innovation necessary to sustain
patentability remains the same."); id. at 12 (stating that Hotchkiss "required a comparison
between the subject matter of the patent, or patent application, and the background skill of the
calling"); id. at 19 (emphasizing "that we find no change in the general strictness with which the
overall test is to be applied").
The temporal distance from Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), to
Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158 (2d. Cir. 1950), is the basis for the statement
"Nearly one hundred years."
49. Harries, 183 F.2d at 158.
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
51. By which I mean the capacity of the rules of the law when confronted with a claim to a
new invention to conclusively settle patentability-without the need to resort to a costly inquiry
into easily disputable factual conclusions. For a comprehensive discussion of legal uncertainty
with specific attention to patent law, see Mullally, supra note 33.
52. Which is not to say that it has not advanced at all. The most notable development is
probably the TSM principle, which is the focus of this section. The Federal Circuit is also
credited with trying to develop the use of the secondary considerations-sometimes called
objective indicia of nonobviousness-introduced in Graham, as well as the requirement that there
must be a nexus between the claimed invention and the application of secondary considerations.
Another example would be the development of rules that allow for the use of secret prior art in
obviousness analyses. There are surely others, rules that can in some cases help provide some
legal clarity to how an obviousness analysis will determine, but the important point here is that
there are not many, and certainly not many with specific effect. For example, there is not a rule
yet that says knowledge of the primary amino acid structure of a protein makes the sequence of
the genomic DNA encoding that protein obvious or nonobvious; nor is there a rule that
determines whether knowledge of the sequence of, for example, a fruit fly gene encoding
fibroblast growth factor receptor makes human homologues obvious or nonobvious.
53. See Long, supra note 38, at 476-80.
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those inventions that present a sufficiently large advance over the
prior art (and not granted otherwise). Consider for a moment what
that entails for decision makers-patent examiners, competitors and
their lawyers, courts, or members of the public-faced with the
question of whether a new invention is nonobvious. A decision
maker must discover and comprehend the attributes of the invention
defined by the claims of a patent (or patent application). The decision
maker must then discover and comprehend the attributes that
comprise the prior art. Then, it must then compare the attributes
comprising the invention with the attributes comprising the prior art
and find a means of comprehending the differences. The decision to
grant or not to grant a patent is determined by a judgment of whether
the differences between the invention and the prior art are big
enough; a quantum not defined in patent law beyond the idea that a
person having ordinary skill in the art knows what it is. As one
commentator has remarked: "It is hard to think of a higher
measurement-cost margin than this."54
A second reason-and a reason that partially responds to the
question of why patent law does not have more rules that can reduce
the measurement cost of obviousness-is that the subject matter of
patent law includes a tremendous variety of complex things, things
existing in a wide variety of technological and market contexts, and
things existing at the very edge of human knowledge for which
attribute-describing vocabularies are often less developed. One
consequence of this is that there is often genuine disagreement over
whether a new invention represents a big enough advance over the
prior art to justify a patent.
A third reason the law may not have taken on more
determinateness stems from a basic purpose of patent law: to
encourage the creation, disclosure, and use of inventions. Specific
54. Id. at 480. Appreciating that the task of determining patentability is so informationally
expensive also suggests that we should be very cautious in presuming that the Patent Office is
always able to perform a quality analysis of patentability. The Office is often described as
overwhelmed with patent applications and the mean time examiners are reported as spending with
each application is sobering. Along these lines, Scott Kieff has recently argued that we should not
expect the Patent Office to always find all of the relevant prior art. Scott Kieff, The Case for
Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents:
When One Size Doesn't Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937 (2009)
(arguing that there is both secret and nonsecret prior art that can be well beyond the resources of
the Patent Office).
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rules banishing large amounts of subject matter from patentability
could be expected to have the general impact of discouraging the
creation, disclosure, and use of inventions directed to the subject
matter and encouraging the redeployment of resources to enterprises
that permit greater reward. Thus, not only is the obviousness
determination hard to get correct, getting it broadly wrong may have
serious consequences for national industrial policy." In view of this
risk, the most straightforward prophylactic might be to deemphasize
broad rules prohibiting patentability in favor of a case-by-case
assessment of new inventions.
A fourth reason is that there may be little need for rules that
determine obviousness with great specificity. For patents that matter,
the system might well be able to await litigation.5 6 By recent
estimates there are roughly 1.8 million in-force U.S. patents," only a
very small fraction of which are thought to have any economic
significance whatsoever." Of that fraction, only a fraction produce
disputes between firms, and even fewer-roughly three thousand
55. A number of commentators have suggested that the courts should use nonobviousness to
banish some biotechnological subject matter from patentability. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 691 (2004) (biotech
and software); Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1745 (2007) (DNA-based claims); Lee Petherbridge, Intelligent TRIPS
Implementation: A Strategy for Countries on the Cusp of Development, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 1133 (2004) (biotech). None of the commentators, as far as I can ascertain, present this
hypothetical, but consider as an example a rule that knowledge in the art of a partial sequence of
cDNA with a suspected function makes obvious later claims to genomic DNAs and cDNAs with
similar sequences from all species, as well as the chemical structures of the corresponding gene
products in different species. A rule this broad, while someday perhaps reflecting the state of the
art of molecular biology, would probably have been badly inaccurate if applied woodenly across
the first quarter century of art. The more likely reality is that analogs or homologs and their
corresponding gene products sometimes would have been obvious and sometimes not, with
perhaps a general increase in probability of obviousness as the years have gone by. Had a rule of
no patentability been imposed, say in 1985, the rule should have been expected to somewhat
discourage the pursuit of some valuable analogs and homologs, to diminish investment in firms
engaged in applying molecular technologies to human problems (e.g., firms pursuing gene
therapies or agricultural improvements), and, thereby, to likely put off the time when moving
from model organisms to humans through the prediction, identification, and cloning of analogs
and homologs becomes regularized.
56. But cf Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 19 (addressing obviousness
and stating, "To await litigation is-for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system.").
57. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL REVIEW
23 (2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/
wipo-pub_93 1.pdf (reporting the number of U.S. patents in force in 2006).
58. See generally Lemley, supra note 30 (arguing that most patents are economically
unimportant); infra note 74.
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patents per year in recent years-make it into a complaint.5 9 Of the
patents that make it into a complaint, only a fraction are subject to a
judicial decision on the merits (a recent "high"-side estimate places
the number at between 86 and 125 patents per year that go to court).60
Fewer patents still are involved in appeals from judicial decisions on
the merits.
Finally, of course, patentability requires an assessment of what a
person having ordinary skill in the art would think about the
question. Channeling the question through hypothetical individuals
imagined to be in possession of the ordinary skill of the calling
invites competing narratives from parties over what such a person
would know, what such a person would think to try when faced with
a problem known in the art, and what expectations such a person
would have for such efforts.
Taken together, the concerns listed above may go far toward
explaining why the law of patentability remains fairly general and is
mostly devoid of rules capable of conclusively determining the
question without resort to factual information normally susceptible to
genuine dispute between competing parties.
2. How the Federal Circuit Helped Rationalize Obviousness
The history of the obviousness doctrine is a long one,6 1 and
observers typically conclude that the Federal Circuit has made more
than one contribution to the doctrine. Of all the contributions the
court is credited6 2 with making, however, perhaps none is more
controversial than the requirement that a determination by the Patent
Office 63 or by a trial court that a patent claim is obvious be
59. Dennis Crouch, Patent Litigation Statistics: Numbers of Patents Being Litigated,
PATENTLY-O, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03/patent-litigati.html.
Professor Wagner reports that over roughly the last twenty years, there have been between
approximately 1.4 and 2.4 patent-infringement suits filed per one thousand in-force patents.
Wagner, supra note 32, at 2143 fig. 1 (2009).
60. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1501 & nn. 26-27 (giving a high-side estimate of 0.2
percent of all issued patents, or between 86 and 125 patents per year).
61. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850) (definitively establishing
the requirement).
62. The doctrine about to be introduced did not, strictly speaking, originate with the Federal
Circuit. The court is, however, credited with (and in some circles accused of) developing it and
amplifying its significance.
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accompanied by a rationale explaining how the decision maker
arrived at its conclusion. In other words, the Federal Circuit began to
insist that a decision maker explain why a person having ordinary
skill in the art would find a patent claim to be obvious.
The Federal Circuit also established an analytical framework
that furnished a vocabulary for articulating evidentiary and analytic
findings concerning obviousness rationales. In a number of cases, the
court set out that a patent claim may be proven obvious by a showing
that at the time the invention was made, the nature of the problem to
be solved, the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, or the
actual prior art references would have suggested or taught the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
This requirement has come to be known as the teaching,
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test,64 and in recent years, the
principle of TSM has received the imprimatur"5 of the Supreme
Court.66 I explain below that the development of the TSM principle
63. See, e.g., William DeVaul & Philip C. Swain, Appeals from the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) and District Courts in Patent Cases, in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1990-2002 253, 283 (1991) ("The BPAI cannot rely on
conclusory statements when dealing with particular combinations of prior art and specific claims,
but must set forth the rationale on which it relies, particularly if that rationale comes from general
knowledge that negates patentability.").
64. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (using this acronym).
65. For language remarkably similar to the analytical framework developed by the Federal
Circuit, see id. at 418:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple
patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the
marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.
The Court also confirmed the Federal Circuit's doctrinal requirement that a decision maker
explain why a person having ordinary skill in the art would find a particular claim to be obvious,
id. ("To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit."), and citing with approval In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be
sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead there must be some articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness."). For additional
language confirming that obviousness can be shown by information about the nature of the
problem to be solved, see id. at 419-20. ("One of the ways in which a patent's subject matter can
be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for
which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent's claims.").
66. It is worth pointing out that while the Court did approve the principle of TSM in KSR
International, it also disapproved of the Federal Circuit's "application of the TSM test" in the
case. Id. at 419-20. Accord Mullally, supra note 33, at 1132 (noting that in KSR the Supreme
Court "overturned" the Federal Circuit's decision "applying" TSM because the court had applied
TSM "too rigidly"); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation
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presents a nice example of how the Federal Circuit made patent law
more rational.
At the outset, however, it is important to point out that the
central observation of this section is that the Federal Circuit's
development of the TSM principle was a sensible and useful
innovation, one that improves the logical connection between patent
law and patent policy and theory. That position does not exclude the
notion that TSM is vulnerable to criticism on some grounds.6 7
Generally speaking, rule choices in patent law adjust benefit and cost
possibilities that affect innovation. To the extent TSM provided
benefits, it presumably also imposed costs.
The three subsections that follow describe (a) how the TSM
principle can be understood as a tool useful for imposing
obviousness policy; (b) how TSM addresses error costs by promoting
accuracy and certainty, and by respecting measurement cost
concerns; and (c) how TSM might work as an incubator for
improvements to the law-particularly improvements that might
increase determinateness.
a. Imposing patent policy
The first important quality of TSM is that it can be understood
as a tool useful for imposing patent policy. To be explicit, this
understanding acknowledges that the dominant policy of obviousness
and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MicH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 32 (2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voI06/eisenberg.pdf (noting that after KSR:
"The Federal Circuit continued to cite its own prior nonobviousness decisions liberally, including
pre-KSR decisions applying the TSM test"). But see John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable
Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 34, 36 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/106/duffy.pdf,
(claiming that in writing KSR the Supreme Court was "disavowing years of lower court
precedent").
In addition, this Article makes no claim about the impact of the KSR opinion on Federal
Circuit or district court behavior. For those interested in knowing more about how KSR may have
impacted courts, see Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the
Federal Circuit's Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. (forthcoming 2010)
(draft on file with author) (reporting an empirical study on Federal Circuit and district court
behavior toward obviousness and anticipation, and arguing that KSR and the Supreme Court's
opinion in the case impacted Federal Circuit and district court behavior notwithstanding the text
of the Court's opinion, and in instances not involving claims of obviousness).
67. It has, in fact, been subjected to much criticism. Some is collected in Lee Petherbridge &
R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of
Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2051, 2091 nn.69-71 (2007).
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is that inventions not obvious to a "person having ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was made" are those that should be
patentable because that standard represents the proper measure of
technological advance sufficient to warrant a patent.68 Thus, the
implementation of obviousness policy hinges on what a person
having ordinary skill in the art would think about the differences
between the prior art and the claimed invention; and more
specifically on whether a person of skill in the art would find those
differences small enough that the patent claim when made would
have been obvious or apparent.
TSM connects the doctrine to this policy because it focuses the
decision maker on the policy inquiry. TSM asks for an explanation
why, in view of the nature of the problem to be solved, the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, and the actual prior art
references, the invention would have been taught or suggested to an
ordinarily skilled artisan. It seeks, therefore, to ask whether the
claimed invention was within the grasp of the art; where it would
have been-where an artisan would understand the differences to be
small enough that the claimed invention could be made-the claim is
obvious, and where it would not have been-where the artisan would
not have an approach that could reasonably be expected to succeed-
the claim is nonobvious.
b. Responding to error and measurement costs
One benefit of seeking to make obviousness doctrine responsive
to obviousness policy is that the law might more effectively set the
level of innovation at a place where the costs and benefits flowing
from the granting of patents are well aligned. This goal, of course,
requires that the law be able to somewhat accurately differentiate
between patentable and unpatentable claims. TSM endeavors to
respond to this concern by at least two mechanisms: promoting
accuracy in decision making and promoting procedural certainty.
68. This is what the statute calls for and is probably well accepted. But while it is rare to
learn of new proposals for obviousness standards, they occasionally come along. See generally
Merges, supra note 47 (discussing economic nonobviousness); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 691, 716 (2004) (arguing for
different standards for different subject matter).
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When it established TSM, the Federal Circuit developed an
objective analysis, one employing objective inputs and transparent
decision making and, accordingly, one susceptible to effective
judicial review. This structure should be expected to promote
accuracy in decision making. The range of prior art available for the
analysis is very broad.69 Not only does it include effectively any
relevant art defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102-including the secret prior
art categories-it also includes the full breadth of knowledge of a
person of ordinary skill in the art as well as information about how
such a person would be inspired to use his or her skills in view of
known problems in the relevant art. After encouraging a search of the
evidence for this information, the framework (usually) requires that a
decision maker then craft an argument explaining why the claimed
arrangement of elements would have been apparent to a person
having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.
This approach discourages decisions based on unarticulated shadow
rationales and discourages the kind of analytical corner cutting that
can lead to error.
TSM also promotes procedural certainty. As used here,
procedural certainty refers to the idea that there is a social benefit to
be had when a legal decision can be relied on as likely to be
conclusive. Because of the factual, objective nature of the inquiry,
TSM should be expected to encourage the belief that parties were
afforded a fair hearing on their claims. 0 This is not to say that in
every instance observers will agree with the decision maker's
conclusion when TSM is used. Nonetheless, the quality and nature of
TSM analysis can diminish the sense that a decision was arbitrary or
ill considered, and thereby encourage confidence in the correctness
of the application of law.
69. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 67.
70. Empirical evidence about the rate at which the Federal Circuit affirms lower-court
decisions using TSM on obviousness is currently underdeveloped and therefore not conclusive
regarding this idea. See id. (reporting a cumulative result for a fifteen-year period (1990-2005)
that the Federal Circuit affirmed obviousness decisions when it used TSM (65.3 percent) at nearly
the same rate it affirmed obviousness analyses that did not use TSM (65.0 percent)). The same
study, however, provides additional evidence relevant to certainty. In analyses evincing the
application of TSM, the Federal Circuit's decision failed to dispose of the question of whether the
claim at issue was obvious only 13.4 percent of the time. Id.
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Compared with an analytic regime that does not require a
decision maker to articulate a rationale, TSM seems to represent a
modest increase in practical measurement cost, primarily because it
requires a more express examination of the knowledge of the art.
This is not necessarily troubling because any increase in
measurement cost should be balanced against whatever efficiency
gains are achieved by improving the accuracy and finality of
obviousness determinations. However, increases in measurement
cost might decrease accuracy in contexts in which heightened costs
discourage a decision maker from spending the resources necessary
to reach an accurate decision. This last concern is, perhaps, amplified
by the fact that in theoretical terms, the measurement cost of the
obviousness determination is quite high" to begin with.
A partial response to the concern that the theoretical cost of
measurement is high is that courts and decision makers, even ones
that employ TSM, are unlikely to assume the theoretically demanded
cost of analysis. From this vantage, TSM can be understood as not so
much (or at least not "just") increasing the cost of measurement, but
as adjusting the cost of measurement. Some costs will increase-
particularly as they relate to a more searching examination of
evidence and the reporting of conclusions that are drawn from it. But
TSM might also push down some other decisional costs.
To some extent, TSM compensates for increases in
measurement cost by furnishing an analytical framework that works
to reduce the cost of arguing that claims are obvious and works to
reduce the cost of presenting decisions that claims are obvious. In
developing TSM, the court set out that a patent claim may be proven
obvious by a showing that at the time the invention was made, the
nature of the problem to be solved, the knowledge of an ordinarily
skilled artisan, and the actual prior art references would have
suggested or taught the claimed invention to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. This development established a vocabulary
for articulating evidentiary and analytic findings concerning
obviousness. By furnishing a vocabulary and analytical structure
useful for deploying the knowledge and skill of the ordinary artisan,
TSM legitimates arguments concerning patentability that might have
71. See supra Part III.A. 1.
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been of questionable validity absent the doctrine. Put slightly
differently, TSM represents a perhaps unprecedented advance in
how, generally, to establish obviousness. TSM is the roadmap to
unpatentability.72 In this respect, this role of TSM may be particularly
significant when it comes to the Patent Office. TSM creates means
by which the Patent Office and Federal Circuit can communicate in
the review of Patent Office rejections.73
The instances in which TSM might increase the cost of decisions
may not matter much.74 For patents that matter, resolution through
post-issue litigation may be a suitable (and to some, even an ideal)
alternative. The basic insight is that the "innovations that are worth
fighting for sort themselves out over time and [can be] vetted by the
institution best able to make an ex post determination regarding
patent value and scope: the courts."" Because so few patents are ever
asserted against a competitor, even if TSM creates an increase in
measurement cost, it is borne by courts in cases in which-as a
policy matter-society might especially care how a person of
ordinary skill in the art understands the invention, the art, and the
magnitude of the differences between the two. Thus, in the case of
litigation, to the extent TSM does increase the cost of assessing
72. To supplement the logical force of this argument, empirical studies indicate that TSM
encourages determinations of invalidity. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 67, at 2094
(reporting a significant downward trend in nonobviousness outcomes in Federal Circuit analyses
that use TSM); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An
Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 953 (2007) (reporting a
three-year study spanning 2002-2005 that finds TSM defeating a finding of obviousness in just
24.5 percent of patents appealed from patent infringement cases).
73. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 67, at 2086 (reporting a significant decrease in
the reversal rate of PTO obviousness decisions between 1990 and 2005, a period during which the
use of TSM by the Federal Circuit increased significantly); see also Cotropia, supra note 72, at
953 (reporting a three-year study spanning 2002-2005 that finds TSM defeating a finding of
obviousness in just 9.26 percent of patent applications appealed from the Patent Office).
74. This basic idea finds support in the numbers of patents litigated, set forth above in Part
III.A. 1. For work supporting or relying on this idea see Lemley, supra note 30, at 1497 ("Because
so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make
detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest in additional resources
examining patents that will never be heard from again."); Kieff, supra note 54 (arguing that
litigation provides the means to address concerns about low-quality patents); and Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?: Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1743, 1782 (2009) ("[I]t is inconceivable that we would want to invest the resources
necessary to fully vet every patent application for validity."). See also DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 95 (2009) (arguing that the
courts are the correct institutions for patentability analysis).
75. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 1782.
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obviousness, it may do so in situations in which the costs of the
determination are most likely to be justified.
For claims in patent applications, it is hard to imagine that TSM
can so adjust the costs of patent examination that it will have much
detrimental impact on the quality of patents issuing from the Patent
Office.76 In those few cases in which it might, the probability that the
patent claims issued (the fraction that are actually obvious) will have
any significant economic impact is predicted by the theory described
above" to be very low. Moreover, in the rare instance in which such
claims take on significant economic importance, they should often
serve as nuclei for litigation. In that context, the viability of legal
claims involving the patent claims should often become apparent,
and pressing the enforcement of clearly invalid claims carries its own
set of risks to patentees.
c. The TSM principle and the future of obviousness
Empirical work suggests that over time the Federal Circuit used
TSM to broaden the use of information in patentability analyses." If
so, it suggests that TSM may work as an incubator for nurturing new
approaches to patentability."
The Supreme Court has prescribed a framework for analyzing
obviousness in which the ultimate conclusion regarding a claim's
obviousness is a legal question sitting atop a highly fact-intensive
analysis." The development of TSM is remarkably consistent with
the prescribed framework, and if anything, the preliminary impact of
the Federal Circuit's emphasis on TSM might have been to amplify
the influence of the factual component of the obviousness analysis.
Whether an invention would have been taught or suggested to a
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time the invention
was made, given the nature of the problem to be solved, the
knowledge of the ordinarily skilled artisan, and in view of the
relevant prior art references is, from the perspective of judicial
76. See supra note 37.
77. See supra Parts II.B, II.A. 1; note 74.
78. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 67, at 2095-96 fig.8 (indicating that the Federal
Circuit is teaching the broad use of prior art information in patentability analyses).
79. To be clear, the thoughts that follow are speculative.
80. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
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review, a question of fact." The consequence of this is that the legal
part of the obviousness question is very thin. The cases tend to turn
heavily on the evidence and the factual conclusions they support.
As TSM begins to mature as part of the jurisprudence, however,
it might have an unappreciated future benefit: it might encourage the
future development of the legal part of the obviousness question. In
other words, the widespread use of TSM might, eventually, lead to a
thickening of the legal part of the obviousness question and thereby
might move the law to a greater level of determinateness.
Structurally, TSM disciplines the obviousness analysis and
encourages a searching analysis of relevant sources of information.8 2
This feature should be expected to discourage decisions based on
unarticulated rationales and should be expected to diminish the
related incentive for decision makers to cut corners analytically. This
disciplining focus is complemented by the TSM-developed
vocabulary and analytic structure. That structure is useful for
focusing argument development on what a person of skill in the art
would try to do when faced with a problem and what expectations
such a person might have for approaches to its solution. In time, it
may become evident that certain kinds of arguments are more likely
to be successful, and it may become clear that certain arguments
reflect commonly held truths about innovation generally, or at least
hold true for a particular area of innovation. Some arguments may
evolve to the point that they begin to be understood as recognizing
rules (or perhaps sub-rules) useful for limiting evidentiary
requirements, reducing the range of genuine factual dispute, or
deciding obviousness cases quickly and at a lower cost."
The idea that cases provide a source of new ideas about the law
is not, of course, unique to TSM. However, using TSM to (largely)
81. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("When patentability turns on the
question of obviousness, the search for and analysis of the prior art includes evidence relevant to
the finding of whether there is a teaching, motivation, or suggestion to select and combine the
references relied on as evidence of obviousness."); see, e.g., McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc.,
262 F.3d 1339, 1351-52, (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he central question is whether there is reason to
combine [the] references," a question of fact drawing on the Graham factors.).
82. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The
"Suggestion Test" as a Rule ofEvidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517 (2006).
83. It is also possible that none of this might come to pass and that the lasting impact of the
TSM principle might be the strong implication that the concept of obviousness is unavoidably
heavily factual in nature.
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define the competitive space in which new ideas about patentability
are encouraged to develop has some advantages over a fully
unconstrained competitive framework. Perhaps the central advantage
is that TSM keeps the parties and decision makers focused on the
central policy issue-would a person of skill in the art find the
invention obvious at the time it was made. TSM also provides a
flexible framework' and should have little problem accommodating
diverse explanations for why a person of skill in the art would have
been suggested or taught an invention in view of artisan knowledge
and experience. Moreover, any sub-rules about the use of
information relevant to the art or about the substantive interpretation
of 35 U.S.C. § 103 that develop through the process might remain
generally bounded by the ultimate approach prescribed by TSM. If
resort can always be had to general TSM, then the resulting
framework might hedge against the broad impact of any specific
rules the court might announce because the court can always fall
back to the TSM principle to adjust a new rule's application to
context.
B. The Federal Circuit and Patent Scope
The purpose of this section is to explain how the Federal Circuit
has rationalized patent law through its work with doctrines that affect
patent scope. As was noted in the previous section, the Federal
Circuit is not solely responsible for the developments attributed to it
here. In both of the examples presented, the court was helped along
and encouraged to proceed as it did by the Supreme Court, and it is
also surely the case that the court was helped along its path by the
arguments and advocacy of the parties that appeared before it. Even
so, the court is conventionally credited (and by some criticized) for
bringing the subject areas of law to their current state of
development. The following subsections explain how developments
84. The empirical work in this area is uniform in pointing toward the conclusion that TSM
represents a flexible approach that does not force determinations favoring patentability. Cotropia,
supra note 72, at 914 ("[R]ecent criticism is not supported by the last four years of Federal
Circuit case law."); Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 67, at 2052 ("[T]he view that emerges is
of a modem jurisprudence of obviousness that is . . . more flexible than has been heretofore
understood."). It bears repeating that the Supreme Court's concern in KSR International v.
Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007), was not with TSM generally but was instead with a specific
example of its application, one that the court felt was too rigid.
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in doctrines surrounding the doctrine of equivalents and claim
construction can be understood as part of a cohesive (if not yet
perfected) effort to rationalize patent law with patent policy and
theory. A central theme has been public notice, suggesting that the
court's focus has been on improving the efficiency of innovation and
competition where patents are implicated. The targets of doctrinal
developments have been information externalities that affect not only
the patent-granting process but also post-grant transactions around
patents.
1. The Death of the Doctrine of Equivalents
When an accused device or process falls within the textual scope
of a patent claim, it is said to literally infringe. In cases in which
literal infringement does not lie, however, patentees are generally
entitled to argue that the accused device or process infringes under
the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents expands a
patentee's exclusive rights beyond the subject matter defined by the
patent's claims-beyond the textual definition provided by the patent
document-by imposing infringement liability where an accused
product or process is only insubstantially different from the claimed
invention."
Created by judges many years ago," the doctrine of equivalents
responds to the policy concern that if competitors can escape
infringement liability by practicing embodiments that represent
insubstantial changes over those patented, potential innovators will
be discouraged from disclosing new inventions, or even taking the
risk of some types of innovation." In this basic sense, the policy of
the doctrine of equivalents is to protect the incentive structure of the
patent system.
This venerable idea comes with a cost. Because it allows
patentees to exclude others from subject matter beyond the textual
scope of a patent claim, the doctrine of equivalents fosters
uncertainty in competition. The reason is that public notice of the
85. It does not-at least as a formal matter--expand the scope of claims.
86. See, e.g., Winans v. Demead, 56 U.S. 330 (1854).
87. Graver Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) ("To permit imitation of
a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing . .. leaving room for-indeed encouraging-the
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes.").
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scope of rights conferred by a patent cannot be had by a full and
thorough reading of a patent and its prosecution history." The
claimed invention has an uncertain penumbra, wherein a
competitor's conduct can warrant liability-even though the conduct
clearly falls outside a patentee's textual definition of the invention.
Reconciling these two competing values-protecting the patent
system from the consequences of allowing the free practice of
insubstantial changes and providing adequate public notice of the
rights conferred by a patent-has been the challenge of the doctrine
of equivalents. And many, I think, would agree that the Federal
Circuit has at least sought to meet it.
How has the court responded to the challenge? Well, there
seems to be good agreement that the Federal Circuit has largely done
away" with the doctrine of equivalents. Perhaps more accurately, the
court has made the doctrine's successful assertion by patentees the
exception, not the rule, in patent infringement cases. There is some
dispute as to how,"o but both interpretive" and empirical9 2 work point
88. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) ("There can
be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.").
89. The doctrine of equivalents is one of those examples in which the Supreme Court has
encouraged the developments that have led to the current state of the doctrine. Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17.
That is not to say that the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of equivalents may be
formally eliminated from the patent law. Quite the contrary, the Supreme Court has insisted that
the doctrine of equivalents remain-even if only in a very disabled form-because to abolish the
doctrine of equivalents would "risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
property." Id. at 739.
90. Some reports credit rule developments as responsible for killing the doctrine of
equivalents. Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine ofEquivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters
of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113, 1156-57 (2006) (interpreting doctrinal rule developments
as limiting the doctrine to the point that it has become obsolete). Others largely reject the notion
that legal rules had much to do with the death of the doctrine and finger procedural developments
as the culprit. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise ofthe Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REv. 955, 976-79 (2007) (reporting the results of an empirical
examination of appellate and trial opinions addressing the doctrine of equivalents). Another view
still is that rules and procedure have cooperated to diminish the usefulness of the doctrine of
equivalents to patentees. See Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine ofEquivalents, 31
CARDOZO L. REv. 1371 (2010) (reporting the results of an empirical examination of appellate
opinions).
91. Adams, supra note 90.
92. Allison & Lemley, supra note 90, at 976-77 ("The doctrine of equivalents was largely
dead by 1998."); Petherbridge, supra note 90, at 1379 (noting that "there is evidence supporting
the claim that the doctrine of equivalents has declined" as a means for establishing infringement
liability).
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toward the conclusion that patentees are only rarely able to establish
liability using a theory of infringement by equivalents. The decline
of the doctrine is represented in figure 1, which shows that over the
last fifteen years (1992-2007) the average rate of dispositive"
patentee success in appeals addressing the doctrine of equivalents
has trended downward.
Trends in Rates of Dispositive Wins94
Equivalents Analyses of the Federal Circuit 1992-2007
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Analysis No.
Figure 1
93. Dispositive patentee success is measured by examining all written Federal Circuit
equivalents analyses and scoring as positive those that evince a mandate that an accused infringer
is liable for infringement under a theory of equivalents, and scoring all others as negative.
94. The ordinate represents a 30-analysis lagged (moving) average of the percentage of
dispositive patentee success, plotted against the number of analyses (n=878). It thus provides a
measure of the recent-average frequency of dispositive patentee success, approximating what a
lawyer might see if he or she were to sample the court's most recent twenty to twenty-five
opinions on the topic at any point in time. On the abscissa, the analysis number moves from left
to right (1992-2007). The linear trend line is a least squares line, having the following statistical
characteristics: r = -.357, P2 = .134, t-obs = -11.433, p = .000. The calculations for the moving
average and linear regression was performed with Microsoft Excel; the graph was created using
Excel.
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The decline of the doctrine of equivalents can be understood as
rationalizing patent law with policy and theory in the sense that it is
directed to reducing the impact of information externalities produced
by the patent-granting process. Perhaps the largest point to make in
connection with the decline of the doctrine of equivalents is that
reducing patentee access to the doctrine creates an incentive for
patent applicants to draft better and more complete claims. To the
extent an applicant believes that successful resort to the doctrine of
equivalents is unlikely, the applicant will have to consider whether to
internalize the cost of drafting claims that might literally provide
adequate-to justify patenting-market exclusivity. An applicant
cannot, however, focus only on drafting claims that are broad enough
to provide adequate market exclusivity. The sticks of patent doctrine
remain.95 The claims an applicant drafts must still avoid prior art
(indeed, as I explain below, failing to do so will diminish a
patentee's use of whatever remains of the doctrine of equivalents),
must align closely enough with the descriptive part of the
specification to avoid being found invalid for failure to meet the
enablement and written description requirements set forth in 35
U.S.C. § 112, and must not be so vague as to be indefinite-and
therefore invalid. Thus, diminishing access to the doctrine of
equivalents should in some cases encourage patent applicants to
think harder about the claims they draft, and thereby perhaps produce
some marginal systemic benefits.
The means by which the Federal Circuit has reduced access to
the doctrine of equivalents further work to diminish the impact of
information externalities produced by the patent-granting process.
Here, perhaps the most significant development in the law
95. Quite obviously, this analysis assumes that the substantive law defining patent invalidity
impacts-and meaningfully constrains-patent drafting behavior either because the Patent Office
will not allow claims that do not meet the statutory requirements or because such claims will be
invalidated should a patentee ever seek to enforce them. How the substantive law defining
invalidity influences patent drafting behavior in practice is a matter of some debate. The
theoretical framing set out, ante, Part II.B., posits that it may not as an empirical matter always
work well at the Patent Office. If one assumes, arguendo, that it does not work reasonably well
after issue either-that owners of truly "invalid" claims normally expect to be able to enforce
such claims-then patentee incentives might, inter alia, favor claims of aggressive breadth and
vagueness. That said, the Federal Circuit's doctrinal development might, even in this case, still be
understood as rational if the court operates under the reasonable belief that defendants will avail
themselves of the opportunity to challenge validity and that legitimate challenges can, generally,
succeed.
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surrounding the doctrine of equivalents that can be attributed to the
Federal Circuit" is the development of a set of doctrines that impose
legal limitations to the reach of the doctrine of equivalents. Below, I
consider several doctrines that impose legal limitations and explain
how they can be understood as encouraging the production of
information helpful for providing the public better notice of the
rights attending a patent.
Perhaps the best studied97 legal limitation is amendment-based
prosecution history estoppel, which is directed to preventing a
patentee from accessing the doctrine of equivalents when a claim
was amended during patent prosecution." As a point of doctrinal
development, the Federal Circuit was inclined to bar any range of
equivalents for a claim limitation that had been amended during
patent prosecution.99 The Supreme Court pulled the law back from
that place, but not far back. It endorsed a somewhat firm view of
estoppel, imposing the rebuttable presumption that an amendment
96. As noted before, the Federal Circuit did not originate all of these doctrinal developments,
but it is credited to varying degrees with developing and deploying them in ways that worked to
diminish the importance of the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc.
v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1064 (2002) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Instead of
deciding this appeal on the basis on which it reaches us-that is, whether to sustain the jury
verdict that stainless steel and aluminum are equivalent substrates for copper foil laminates-my
colleagues launch yet another assault on the doctrine of equivalents.").
97. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 159 (2002) (criticizing the Supreme Court's rejection of an absolute bar
to any range of equivalents for a limitation amended during the course of prosecution in large part
with the argument that the holding encouraged patentees to impose information costs on the
Patent Office and on the public). This Article acknowledges the arguments presented in
Reconsidering Estoppel and confirms that the arguments offered there find some purchase when
applied to other legal limitations to the doctrine of equivalents.
98. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)
(adopting a rebuttable presumption that a narrowing amendment surrenders equivalents);
Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(holding that canceling an independent claim and rewriting a dependent claim into independent
form creates a presumption of estoppel). The arguments presented in connection with
amendment-based prosecution history estoppel for the most part have force when applied to
argument-based prosecution history estoppel, which seeks to prevent the patentee from
recapturing through the doctrine of equivalents subject matter surrendered during patent
prosecution by argument. See Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (recognizing estoppel by argument). Argument-based estoppel will not, therefore, be
afforded separate treatment.
99. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("In response to En Banc Question 3, we hold that when a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel, no range of equivalents is available for the amended claim
element."), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
DEVELOPMENT OF PA TENT LAW
made to satisfy a requirement of the Patent Act surrenders
equivalents between the original claim and the amended claim. To
overcome the presumption, "[t]he patentee must show that at the
time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be
expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent."" Accordingly, the current rule
is mandated by the Supreme Court and occasionally allows a range
of equivalents for amended claims. This analysis acknowledges the
current state of the law, but it generalizes the rule for discussion to
that of the absolute bar because (1) that was the rule the Federal
Circuit preferred, and (2) the frequency of patentee success in cases
following the imposition of the Supreme Court's rule points toward
the conclusion that the Supreme Court may have left the law in a
state that is, practically speaking, fairly close to where the Federal
Circuit thought it should be.
Refusing equivalents for amended claim limitations discourages
information externalities produced by the patent-granting process
because it penalizes patent applicants for overclaiming and for
unclear drafting. To avoid amending claims, applicants must
consider whether to take the cost of drafting claims that either will
avoid rejection or, if rejected can be sustained on appeal. Put slightly
differently, applicants are encouraged to draft claims that are more
likely to be patentable.
Applicants can increase the probability of drafting patentable
claims by doing any number of things, several of which are
beneficial to the patent system. By way of example, applicants might
increase their investigation and analysis of prior art before filing an
application. This practice helps applicants anticipate possible prior
art-based rejections and draft claims in ways to avoid encompassing
prior art. To discourage rejections that might lead to amendment,
applicants might also be encouraged to present and explain art to
examiners in ways that reveal how the applicant understands the art
to relate to the claimed invention. Applicants must still, however, use
care in the vagueness employed in claiming the invention. If
vagueness is understood as overbreadth, it may provoke a rejection
based on prior art, or it may provoke a rejection based on the claim's
100. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 741.
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poor alignment with the descriptive part of the specification. In both
instances, the risk for the applicant is that it may need to overcome
the rejections by amendment (or argument"'). Similarly, if vagueness
is employed in a manner that makes claims too indefinite, an
applicant, to get the claim issued, may need to either amend the
claim language to improve its definiteness or, perhaps, provide
additional explanation (i.e., argument) of its meaning.
These considerations should normally diminish information
externalities, and in at least some cases will have the effect of
encouraging the cheapest cost producer of information about the
invention-the patent applicant-to produce information about the
invention that makes its way into the file wrapper of the patent. The
direction of the effect is generally toward better information about
the invention and its relation to the art. This can be expected in some
cases to improve the quality of patent examination by reducing the
cost of measuring patentability, it can be expected in some cases to
improve the reliability of patentees' and competitors' predictions
about enforceability and value after a patent issues, and it can be
expected in some cases to reduce the cost to courts of assessing
infringement and validity. Moreover, when patent applicants are
forced to amend their claims, public notice is furthered to an even
greater extent. The amendment is notice to competitors to focus
design-around efforts on the amended limitation(s). Amendment
becomes the roadmap to noninfringing improvement.
Three additional legal limitations to the reach of the doctrine of
equivalents that can be understood as directed to discouraging
information externalities are the prohibition against a scope of
equivalents that encompasses subject matter disclosed but not
literally claimed in a patent specification;10 2 the prohibition against a
scope of equivalents that encompasses subject matter disparaged or
disavowed in the descriptive part of the patent specification;"' and
101. See supra note 98.
102. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 238 F.3d 1347 (2001) (en banc)
(confirming this rule).
103. Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284 (2004) ("Dr. Gaus described the invention as
requiring the protective circuitry to function regardless of the operating state of the apparatus ....
Having disavowed coverage of devices in which . . . the protective cut-off mechanism is not
triggered until the water reaches the electrical operating system, the patentee cannot reclaim that
surrendered claim coverage by invoking the doctrine of equivalents.").
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the prohibition against a scope of equivalents that would eliminate
the meaning of a claim element." These legal limitations encourage
applicants to consider the cost of drafting better patent specifications
and claims. Like the estoppel just discussed, they work their
influence by penalizing patentees for sloppy or overly aggressive
patent drafting and for strategic behaviors that shift the cost of
information about the legal scope of an invention from an inventor to
the Patent Office and the public.
By preventing a patentee from accessing the doctrine of
equivalents for subject matter disclosed but not claimed in a patent
specification, the Federal Circuit helps to prevent patentees from
drafting narrow claims, and then later (after issue) seeking market
exclusivity much broader than the text of those narrow claims.
Because the Patent Office does not examine equivalents of a claimed
invention for patentability, presenting the Office with narrow claims
has the effect of limiting relevant prior art and making easier an
applicant's claim to patentability. Without the Federal Circuit's rule,
a viable strategy for patent applicants is to fill a specification with
different embodiments, draft narrow claims, directed perhaps to the
most patentable ones, and then later argue that the substance of the
invention included the unclaimed embodiments based on their
disclosure in the specification. The advantage of the strategy to
patentees is that it can decrease the cost of patent acquisition, secure
patent scope that is never subject to examination by the Patent
Office,' and, because narrow claims suggest an invention of narrow
104. Pemwalt Corp. v. Durland Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Supreme
Court endorsed the principle in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S.
17, 29 (1997), holding that the doctrine of equivalents should not be applied so broadly as to
effectively eliminate a claim element. Id. at 39 n.8 ("Thus, under the particular facts of a case, . . .
if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete
judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury
to resolve.").
105. It might be remiss not to point out that another legal limitation to the doctrine of
equivalents is a prohibition against a scope of equivalents that encompasses the prior art. This
rule is sensible enough in that it seeks to prevent a patentee from capturing through the doctrine
of equivalents subject matter in the prior art and presumably unpatentable in the first instance. See
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
However, the high measurement cost of patentability, see supra Part III.A.1, makes this rule an
unwieldy and expensive one in practice. This analysis suggests that a better approach is a more
balanced one. Retain the rule, for it may still be needed ex post. But also encourage applicants to
give greater consideration to the patentability of their claims ex ante, thereby diminishing the
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market exclusivity, misdirect competitors as to the scope of the
patented invention.
By disapproving this strategy, the Federal Circuit encourages
applicants to consider the cost of drafting patentable claims that more
accurately define the market exclusivity sought. Applicants can
increase the likelihood of successfully drafting patentable claims
using the techniques described earlier in the discussion of
prosecution history estoppel. But, as in that context, adjusting to the
Federal Circuit's rule simply by drafting broader or vaguer claims is
risky for patentees. Claims that are too broad or too vague may lead
to prior art-based or patent disclosure-based rejections, which may in
turn present the risks of prosecution history estoppel. Thus, the
direction of the influence of the rule prohibiting the use of the
doctrine of equivalents to capture disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter, like the estoppel rule just discussed, is to encourage the
cheapest cost producer of information about the invention-the
patent applicant-to consider the cost of (and hopefully in some
cases produce) socially useful information about the invention that
makes its way into the file wrapper and patent.
The legal limitation to the reach of the doctrine of equivalents
that prevents a patentee from accessing the doctrine in instances in
which the equivalents sought encompass subject matter disavowed in
the descriptive part of the patent specification further encourages
applicants to consider the cost of drafting better specifications and
claims. When an applicant disparages (or even more expressly
disavows) subject matter in a patent specification, the act can suggest
to observers like patent examiners and competitors that the subject
matter is not within the scope of the invention disclosed in the patent.
This sort of misdirection discourages examination of the subject
matter and might lead competitors to believe that the practice of the
subject matter is not an infringement. By disapproving equivalents
encompassing disparaged or disavowed subject matter, the Federal
Circuit rule again encourages the cheapest cost producer of
information about the invention to consider taking on the cost of
providing socially useful information about the boundaries of the
patent right.
need for an expensive ex post assessment of whether an embodiment asserted to be an equivalent
would itself be patentable.
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The legal limitation that prevents patentees from accessing the
doctrine of equivalents when resort to the doctrine would eliminate
(or vitiate) the meaning of a claim limitation works to reduce the
impact of information externalities produced by the patent-granting
process in a few ways, which require some explanation. In each
instance, the direction of the development is to seek to discourage
externalities by encouraging patent applicants to draft claims that
more accurately and clearly define the market exclusivity sought.
Modern patent infringement analyses consist of two basic steps:
"First, the claim must be properly construed to determine its scope
and meaning. Second, the claim as properly construed must be
compared to the accused device or process."o' The second step is
applied by the doctrine of the all-elements (or all-limitations) rule.
The rule requires that the infringement comparison proceed on an
element-by-element (or limitation-by-limitation) basis. The meaning
of this is that each element (or limitation) of a patent claim must find
a corresponding element in an accused device or process either
literally, or equivalently. If this comparison cannot be completed for
each claim element, infringement will not lie.
The application of the all-elements rule has at least two general
impacts on patent applicant behavior. First, it should encourage
patent applicants to choose their words carefully when making
claims of invention. Placing additional elements in a claim, which
typically has a narrowing impact on the scope of rights a claim
confers, and which therefore usually makes patent acquisition easier
and less costly, will not be overlooked in an infringement analysis.
The all-elements rule thus imposes a strictness on claim drafting,
encouraging applicants to seek to get the balance just right; adequate
coverage must be achieved in an economy of words, but an applicant
must still keep in mind the previously described constraints on
overbreadth and vagueness. Second, the close comparison prescribed
by the all-elements rule tends generally to limit the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents by discouraging abstract, holistic arguments
in favor of equivalency.
The all-elements rule also has a more specific application to the
doctrine of equivalents. Sometimes known by the separate label of
106. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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"vitiation theory," the law is that a theory of equivalence cannot
extend so broadly as to vitiate the meaning of a claim element. The
concept of vitiation can be understood as trying to push in the
direction of reducing information externalities by providing some
guidance on the range of equivalents possible for a particular claim
element. To be clear, it does not dispose of every theory a patentee
might promote about a scope of equivalents, but it may improve
clarity in some cases, especially those in which the difference
between the claim limitation and the proffered scope of its equivalent
can be understood as binary in character. A typical example comes
from Asyst Technologies., Inc. v. Emtrack, Inc.,"' in which the
Federal Circuit agreed with a trial court that the doctrine of
equivalents cannot be extended to reach a system using "unmounted"
structural elements when the patent claim defined similar structural
elements as "mounted on" a "work station."
a. Other considerations
This Article is directed to an examination of Federal Circuit
doctrinal developments, and so this short subsection represents
something of an aside.
Briefly, then, the empirical studies that have examined the
current state of the doctrine of equivalents all point in the direction of
a significant-appearing decline in the ability of patentees to use the
doctrine to establish liability for patent infringement.'o This suggests
that the Federal Circuit has challenged the basic policy that underlies
the doctrine of equivalents o--the idea that insubstantial changes to
well-claimed inventions are so easy to develop and market that
patent law must retain the doctrine of equivalents to ensure that
innovators have adequate incentives to invent, disclose, and
commercialize.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit has arguably demonstrated that
the basic policy of the doctrine of equivalents is not systemically
very significant. The evidence is that all the while the courts were
killing the doctrine of equivalents, patent applicants were increasing
107. 402 F.3d 1188, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
108. See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 90, at 956-58; Petherbridge, supra note 90.
109. Petherbridge, supra note 90 (making this argument).
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the rate at which they filed applications for new inventions.1o This
suggests that innovators might not need the encouragement of the
doctrine of equivalents to invent, disclose, and commercialize."' The
evidence is also that more patents are subject to litigation,' 12
suggesting the interpretation that patents are still capable of
conferring valuable commercial rights. Together this evidence
suggests that the doctrine of equivalents might be fairly unimportant
in terms of systemic economic significance. If patent law decides to
retain it in some form, the better policy reason might be for use in
only the most exceptional cases-and essentially only for reasons of
fairness. If so, this tends to validate the position of some Federal
Circuit judges expressed years ago that the application of the
doctrine of equivalents should be the exception, not the rule."3
2. Claim Construction
In its treatment of the doctrine of equivalents the Federal Circuit
confronted and addressed a set of information costs that flow from
the patent-granting process and tend to obscure the enforceable scope
of a patent. The court's development of doctrinal rules to address
these costs can be understood as rational in the sense that the rules
seek to place the cleanup costs on those most cheaply able to bear
them, and seek more generally to encourage a public policy that
favors good public notice of patent rights. A logical consequence of
these doctrines, as well as of the more general decline of the doctrine
110. See PATENT PUBL. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/acrobat/
ppacannual 11-30-01 .pdf.
111. Another possibility is that the unavailability of the doctrine has encouraged the
additional inventing behavior. In other words, the death of the doctrine of equivalents has pushed
innovators to invent and disclose more, perhaps to ensure that commercial innovations (which
may embody many inventions) find adequate protection. This may or may not be optimal. See
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 29, at 62-63.
112. See Wagner, supra note 32 (documenting the increase in patent litigation intensity); see
also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 192 (2008) (reporting the percentage of lawsuits involving
software patents).
113. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (1991) (refusing to find
infringement by equivalents, stating, "Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception,
however, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent
claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of
every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the
claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose.").
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of equivalents as a liability-establishing tool, has been to concentrate
the analytical task of assessing a patent's scope on the patent
document itself, and much more specifically on a patent's claims.
The analytical process used to determine patent scope from the
text of a patent claim is generally known as claim construction.
Claim construction involves construing, or interpreting the words of,
a patent claim. The basic idea is to operationalize the words of the
claim-to make them get up and go to work in analyses of
infringement, patentability, and enforceability. And, in view of the
reform of the doctrine of equivalents described above, the idea that
the law required a complementary development of claim construction
doctrine seems entirely rational, if not a fait accompli.
The remainder of this section describes very generally the
efforts the court has made to develop claim construction doctrine. In
so doing, it points out that Federal Circuit-driven developments in
claim construction law can be understood as seeking to rationalize
patent law with patent policy and theory in much the same way as
the court's reforms of the doctrine of equivalents. However, the
discussion also points out that the Federal Circuit's development
efforts seem to have stalled with its opinion in Phillips v. A WH
Corp."4 The court's opinion in the case can be understood as a retreat
from legal development in the area of claim construction, and when
considered in view of the developments the court had previously
undertaken, the opinion in Phillips seems best understood as having
a derationalizing impact-to some extent attenuating patent law from
patent policy and theory.
a. Early movement toward rationalization
The Federal Circuit has worked to improve the law of claim
construction, perhaps beginning in earnest with its decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments."' After granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's conclusion that the
interpretation of patent claims was "exclusively the province of the
court,"ll6 as opposed to a jury. Among the bases for the Supreme
Court's holding was the argument that:
114. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
115. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
116. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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[t]he construction of written instruments is one of those
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than
jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent
construction in particular "is a special occupation,
requiring, like all others, special training and practice. The
judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to
give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury;
and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing
such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be[,]" . . . , for
"the claims of patents have become highly technical in
many respects as the result of special doctrines relating to
the proper form and scope of claims that have been
developed by the courts and the Patent Office.""'
A natural understanding of the idea that judges need to construe
patent claims because of the "highly technical" nature of claims
resulting from "special doctrines" controlling claims' form and scope
is that-while ultimately a "mongrel practice"-claim construction
should be understood as having a strongly legal aspect. In view of
the theory of the Federal Circuit set out earlier,"' the description of
claim construction as having a strongly legal aspect means that,
"allocating the interpretive task to judges [sh]ould extend and
enhance the development of legal rules guiding the construction of
patent claims."119
After Markman, one issue of internal dispute at the Federal
Circuit was how much deference to give trial court interpretations of
patent claims. Using the vehicle of Cybor Corp. v. Fas Technologies,
Inc.,120 the Federal Circuit concluded that the answer was none,
reasoning that the task of claim construction was "purely legal." 2 '
The decision concentrated in the Federal Circuit control over the
claim construction issue to the point that the Federal Circuit now had
(formally) nearly unfettered power over the scope, content, and
117. Id. at 388-89 (citation omitted).
118. SeesupraPartl.
119. This framing has been developed in earlier work. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra
note 9, at 1120-24.
120. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
121. Id at 1456.
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application of the "special doctrines"-or rules-of claim
construction.
Taken together, Markman and Cybor can be understood as
moving toward the goal of rationalizing the lawl2 2 because both
represent steps helpful to getting the Federal Circuit the power over
the law necessary to develop and improve it. And, by several
accounts, the Federal Circuit began using the power: it started to
experiment with approaches to the claim construction task.123
Given the various accounts, it is hard to articulate with precision
a unifying theme for the court's experimentation. If there was a
unifying theme, it may well have been the development of a view
among at least some of the judges that there should be a "right" way
to do claim construction. By using the proper approach-for
example, by creating a theory of claim construction, or, perhaps, a
process of using the evidence available to give meaning to claim
scope-the Federal Circuit might help give greater predictability to
the claim construction exercise. A reason predictability might be
enhanced by an approach that emphasizes a "right" way to do claim
construction is because substantive rules, or, perhaps, analytical
rules, could have the benefit of addressing some of the information
costs involved in the claim construction process.
For example, rules could be used to define the validity and
relative weight of pieces of information that can be brought to bear in
a claim construction analysis. Thus, rules might be expected in some
instances to reduce uncertainty about whether a court will accept a
piece of information as probative of the meaning of claim language.
In other instances, rules framing the task of claim construction might
prescribe the relative weight information should be given. Thus,
122. As this Article is directed to revealing a rational course of doctrinal development over
broad swaths of law, it cannot address all arguments critical of the doctrinal developments it
discusses. And when it comes to Markman and especially Cybor, there is no lack of criticism. See
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?: Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Jurisprudence 5-6 nn.20-21 (Apr. 3, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (collecting commentary on the cases); Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 9, at 1109 n.10, 1124 n.80 (same).
123. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 2, 4
(2000) (emphasizing the existence of two approaches to claim interpretation: "hypertextualism"
and "pragmatic textualism"); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 9 (empirically demonstrating
procedural and holistic approaches); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 49 (2005) (arguing
that patent law evinces distinct claim construction paradigms and methodologies).
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rules might be expected to have a marginal impact on the cost of
information in an analysis-they can be used to tell whether, and
how much, a litigant needs to worry about a particular theory an
opponent presses.
By prescribing a theory of claim construction, or a set of rules
that frame a process for using information in a claim construction
analysis, the Federal Circuit might also provide valuable formative
information to the patent community as a whole. If the court tells
parties that particular sources of information are especially
influential, or even dispositive, it has explained to parties who might
desire to secure a particular scope of coverage how to secure that
coverage. It has also informed the Patent Office how the court will
treat the claim. The Patent Office can then make efforts to provide
that its "broadest reasonable" construction is at least as broad as what
a court might give. Thus, the information provided by rules addresses
information costs not only ex post; it also has a formative impact: it
may help to guide and channel the behavior of patent applicants ex
ante.
To be clear, it is presumably no small feat to prescribe sensible
rules for the interpretation of a patent claim that are reliable enough
to predictably channel information and guide competitor behavior.12 4
But it is not clear that it cannot be done. And if it can be done,
greater public notice of patent rights might be had, improvements to
patented subject matter might be made more confidently, and
transactions around patents might occur more efficiently.
Competitors might better predict how a court-and ultimately the
Federal Circuit-would interpret a claim, thereby encouraging
settlement of some marginal number of cases. Trial judges might
approach summary judgment more confidently, believing that if they
apply the process of claim construction laid down by the Federal
Circuit, they will be likely to obtain a correct interpretation. By this
avenue summary judgment might come more quickly and efficiently
in patent cases, with the summary determinations being often
124. Accord S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy
Levers, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 749, 761 (2010) (observing that claim construction decision making
may be an act of judgment based imposed on situations that are "never the same" and in which
the "issues are inevitably a blend of facts and law as well as context and technology"); Mullally,
supra note 33 (identifying sources of uncertainty in patent law and suggesting an approach for
addressing uncertainty).
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affirmed on appeal should anyone bother. In sum, the promise of
using reasonable rule constraints'25 to define a "right" way to do
claim construction are the systemic advantages of reduction in
transactional cost and encouragement of good public notice of the
patent right.12 6 Advantages that might improve the benefits the public
receives from the patent system.
b. Stalled
For some reason, the experimentation that did happen did not
produce doctrinal changes with enough jurisprudential purchase to
last.1' Perhaps the most significant blow to the then-ongoing judicial
125. This is not an article directed to what the content of any rules constraining the claim
construction process should be; however, one anticipates that whatever rules might develop
should be reasonable in the sense that their strictness would not prevent an appropriate level of
decisional flexibility in the fraction of potential patent disputes in which such flexibility might be
needed.
126. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors R. Polk Wagner & Joseph Scott Miller,
Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 03-1269 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2004).
127. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to analyze why this might have been the case.
Some of the leading theories might include that the task of claim construction-essentially
interpreting words in a document-is so inherently indeterminate that it cannot be given
constraints that guide and channel it in any way. See David Schwartz, Courting Specialization:
An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District
Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1699 (2009). Another
view is that the judges just could not reach agreement; as individuals perhaps they were too
unwilling to part with their own views about the task and controlling law to reach the compromise
needed to move the law. Another view still is that the development process was adversely
affected by the influence of the construct of a person of ordinary skill in the art-a dominant
feature of the patent law. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their
"Interpretive Community": A Call for Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. TECH.
321, 328 (2008) (proposing that the perspective of the ordinary artisan be rejected by the patent
law in the context of claim construction and replaced with a "hybrid" one that increases emphasis
on the legal aspects of the task). Another theory still is that the Federal Circuit is captive to the
quality of the Patent Office's performance. The court's heavy reliance on evidence intrinsic to the
patent-especially the specification and claims-places the court in a position in which it is in
some respects at the whim of how well the patent office performs its task of ensuring that patent
disclosures contain quality information about the scope of the claim of right to an invention.
Still another theory might be that the court's jurisprudence simply could not handle the
weight of the criticism that the reversal rate of trial court claim interpretations is too high. The
reported reversal rates range from roughly 30 to 50 percent. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075,
1100-06 (2001) (reporting reversal rates); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges
Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 17-31 (2001) (same); id. at 27
("The high reversal rate on claim construction is problematic."); id. at 28 (referring to "the high
percentage of reversals" when it comes to claim construction); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231,
243-47 (2005) (updating Moore's prior study); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223
Spring 2010] DEVELOPMENT OF PA TENT LA W
innovation was struck in Phillips v. A WH Corp.128 In the opinion, the
court confronted a dispute between judges who had been promoting
distinct doctrinal approaches to determining the correct meaning of
patent claims.129 Purporting to "clarifly]"'" its jurisprudence, the
court rejected the concept that there is a "right" way to analyze claim
scope:
[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting
claim construction. Nor is the court barred from considering
any particular sources or required to analyze sources in any
specific sequence, as long as those sources are not used to
contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of
the intrinsic evidence . . .. The sequence of steps used by
(2008) (reporting reversal rates); see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and
Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction
Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 207 (2001); id. at 221-22 ("Given the confusion
expressed by the trial courts about claim construction procedures and the extremely high
percentage of changes to claim construction language by the Federal Circuit, claim construction is
not consistent or predictable at either the trial or the appellate level."); Michael Saunders, A
Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215 (2007); Andrew
T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear
Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 711, 741-42 (2003).
The idea that the reversal rate(s) measured by the above-referenced studies is too high
has been very recently challenged. See Richard S. Gruner, How High is Too High?: Reflections
on the Sources and Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981, 985 (2010) (arguing that a host of social harms linked to measured
reversal rates conventionally understood to be "high" are "mistaken interpretations" and that, in
light of selection effects arguably causing only problematic construction cases to be presented to
the Federal Circuit after most simpler cases have been settled, "the surprising question is not why
the Federal Circuit claim construction reversal rates are so high,but rather why these rates are not
even higher"'). But see Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1161, 1193 (2010) (arguing in response to Professor Gruner: "claim construction
reversal rates not only appear high, but after considering a variety of explanations-including
selection bias-actually are high").
128. For a more complete treatment of the impact of the Phillips opinion, as well as a
normative analysis, see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 122 (presenting an empirical
assessment of the impact of the Phillips opinion).
129. The different approaches have been described elsewhere. See Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 9 (describing "procedural" and "holistic" approaches to the claim construction
inquiry). The procedural approach emphasized the use of procedural constraints to guide and
channel information usage. It emphasized judicial reliance on commonly held meanings of patent
claim terms gleaned from objective, publicly available sources and placed the burden of arguing
for deviations from that "ordinary" meaning on the patent applicant. The holistic approach, by
contrast, permitted varying and unpredictable emphasis on one or another form of interpretive aid.
Thus, in some cases claim language would be dispositive, while in others snippets from the
specification, or descriptions or pictures of embodiments, might be controlling. In still other
instances, emphasis might fall on the prosecution history.
130. 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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the judge in consulting various sources is not important;
what matters is for the court to attach the appropriate
weight to be assigned to those sources in light of the
statutes and policies that inform patent law. In [our
precedents], we did not attempt to provide a rigid algorithm
for claim construction, but simply attempted to explain
why, in general, certain types of evidence are more valuable
than others."'
The clear message from Phillips is that claim construction is not
a task that should be guided and shaped by rules. Instead, courts
should select and judge information useful for establishing claim
scope on a case-by-case basis in light of the statutes and policies that
inform patent law. Given the language of the court's opinion, it
appears that what a number of observers understood as efforts at
judicial innovation, should now be understood as doing little more
than providing "general" information about how the statutes and
policies of patent law interacted with the sources of information
present in some prior cases.
Confirming the idea that the central message of Phillips is that
there is no "right" analytical framework for construing claims, the
Federal Circuit has sought to discourage language in subsequent
opinions suggesting that there might be a definable process for
construing claims. In a recent case'3 2 the court took the relatively
unusual step of issuing a correction'33 to an opinion on this point,
striking and replacing language that indicated that the panel might
have imposed a framework on its claim construction analysis:
After the word id. at line 14, strike:
- Phillips teaches that these sources should be accorded
relative weights in the order listed, with the words of
the claims themselves being the most relevant. Id. at
1314-19. Accordingly, we discuss each source of
meaning of the claim term. . . in this order.
And replace with:
131. Id. at 1324.
132. Tim Holbrook deserves credit for bringing this case-Microprocessor Enhancement
Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008)-to my attention.
133. Appeal No. 07-1249 (Apr. 16, 2008) (correcting the original opinion decided April 1,
2008).
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Phillips teaches that these sources should be accorded
relative weights depending on the circumstances of the
case, with intrinsic sources being the most relevant. Id.
at 1314-19. Accordingly, we discuss each source of
meaning of the claim term . .. granting each source the
required relative weight.
It is also worth noting that Phillips does not overrule'3 4 any case
or in any meaningful way prevent a trial judge or Federal Circuit
panel from deciding in any particular case that there is a "right" way
to do claim construction. In other words, notwithstanding the
language just quoted, there is no prohibition against concluding that
claim meaning should be determined from an objective, publicly
available source like a seminal scientific article or a dictionary and
sticking with that interpretation unless a party can show that the
patent applicant clearly intended another meaning. Thus, when it
comes to claim construction, judges are largely free to conclude what
they want, by whatever means they want.
c. Why Phillips is "derationalizing"
In view of Markman and Cybor-through which the Federal
Circuit grabbed final power over all things claim construction-the
court's opinion in Phillips arguably represents a derationalization of
the law. One of the main benefits to the patent system of the Federal
Circuit taking plenary power over the scope, content, and application
of the law is that the court can use that power to manage and direct
the law's development. Such power might be used to experiment
with ways to improve the public notice function of patents so that
improvements to existing innovations and deals around patents could
occur more efficiently. But by declaring that there is no "right" way
to do claim construction, the Phillips opinion seems to be a statement
that the court will not take this path.
If it is true that the court has abandoned the process of trying to
develop the law, then there may be less reason for the court to have
the plenary power it has taken. Perhaps the most plausible remaining
reason might be to have the power to correct wayward trial court
134. Accord Phillips, 415 F.3d. at 1319-23 (discussing Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix,
Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
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decisions. But this rationale presents very serious questions. Perhaps
the most pressing of these is, given the flexibility with which
information can enter and influence the post-Phillips claim
construction analysis, how is the Federal Circuit to be confident that
its view of the meaning of the claim language is any better than that
of the trial court? Are the kinds of claim construction errors the
Federal Circuit can be confident about in a post-Phillips world the
kind that it needs plenary power to correct?
The concern is amplified when one appreciates that while claim
construction may have a strongly legal aspect, it also has a factual
aspect. As the Supreme Court noted, it is a "mongrel" practice.
Plenary power seems to make sense when the court uses it to "ride
herd" on the patent law generally, guiding all courts in the intake and
use of facts and information helpful to assessing the proper meaning
of claim language in view of the statutes and policies of the law. In
addition, when the law defines the contours of the use of facts and
information, lower court decisions on such use seem amenable to
appellate review.
Plenary power seems to make less sense when it is imposed only
to validate ex post decisions involving conclusions of fact that can be
legitimately disputed. When power is used in this way, the problems
generally recognized in appellate review of factual determinations
begin to loom. Without an analytical framework for addressing claim
construction, the law should expect more problems from evidence
that is "lost in print" and more cases in which such evidence
becomes "especially pregnant.""m There will be more cases where
the Federal Circuit should hesitate to assume that the factual aspects
of the claim construction analysis could not have controlled. And
while prescribing an analytical framework for claim construction
may not entirely solve this problem, it at least provides a means of
mitigation.
There is always, in patent cases, the patent itself. A fair read of
the Phillips opinion suggests that the patent document itself is the
remedy to the concerns just raised.
Much of the time, upon reading the specification [from the
perspective of its role in teaching a person of ordinary skill
135. See Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd. v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
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in the art], it will become clear whether the patentee is
setting out specific examples of the invention to accomplish
those goals, or whether the patentee instead intends for the
claims and the embodiments in the specification to be
strictly coextensive. The manner in which the patentee uses
a term within the specification and claims usually will make
the distinction apparent. 36
There are, however, reasons not to be too sanguine over the
backstopping powers of the patent document. Those reasons have
already been amply discussed in this Article.m' Briefly summarized,
the theory suggests that patent applicants and the Patent Office have
strong incentives to seek vagueness in patent claims and
specifications. If this is so, the Federal Circuit's plans to use the
patent document-and particularly the descriptive part of the
specification-to backstop the looseness of claim construction
analysis might be somewhat unrealistic. The patent-document-
solves-everything approach expressly adopts a deferential posture to
a source of information, that to be useful, depends in significant part
on how strictly the Patent Office administers the patent-granting
process. Thus, a quite likely post-Phillips future is one in which the
Federal Circuit is regularly confronted with a plurality of equally
good-appearing constructions of the claims at issue in any particular
case. The court will have to choose one because that is the role it has
taken for itself; but in view of all that could have gone into a
construction being reviewed, the court might have a tough time in
some cases identifying a "best" construction. Given the looseness of
the analysis, the court might also have a difficult time articulating
how it got to the construction that it did with explanations that might
be predictably applied to future cases.
Thus, the impact of the Phillips opinion seems derationalizing.
The court seems to have abandoned experimenting with means to
improve the public notice function of patents, but not in the obvious
service of any other equally weighty purpose. The approach taken
136. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
137. See supra Part II.B; see also Sichelman, supra note 127, at 19 (rejecting the court's
argument that parties can with reasonable certainty and predictability distinguish between using
the specification to interpret claim meaning (a generally accepted if not lauded practice) and
using the specification to (improperly) import an additional limitation to a patent claim).
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seems logically to encourage unpredictability in claim construction.
Decision makers will be forced to make choices from a menu of
complex and contradictory information with little guidance as to how
to elect in ways consonant with patent law and policy. Moreover, the
looseness of the inputs and inquiry will further amplify the
importance of the factual aspects of claim construction analysis,
which could have the impact of calling into serious question the
Federal Circuit's posture of de novo review.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has explained how doctrinal developments
conventionally attributed to the Federal Circuit can be understood as
rationalizing patent law with patent policy and theory. In the context
of obviousness, the court developed doctrine that sought to
harmonize patent law with the purpose of the obviousness inquiry.
The same developments can also be read as addressing theoretical
concerns about the costs of erroneous Patent Office decision making,
and the difficulty of applying the obviousness standard. And, as the
discussion speculates, the doctrinal development may have
positioned the law well for future development.
In the context of patent scope, the Federal Circuit has targeted
information externalities that impact the patent-granting process and,
logically, later impact transactions involving patents. The main thrust
of the court's efforts has been to seek to place the cost of information
on patentees; particularly as that cost relates to providing more
complete and clearer patent claims. In the area of the doctrine of
equivalents this was pursued through a number of legal limitations
that restrict the use of the doctrine of equivalents where patentees
could have drafted better claims and specifications, but did not. A
logical consequence of this approach was to focus the public notice
function of patents squarely on the text of the patent claims. The
court took steps initially to establish in itself the power needed to
develop the law involved in construing claim text. It also took steps
in the direction of innovation, experimenting with methodologies for
doing claim construction that-like its innovation in the doctrine of
equivalents-sought to leverage the information wealth of the patent
applicant to improve the public notice function of patent claims. The
court has since, in its opinion in Phillips, appeared to abandon its
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experiments in favor of an analysis that is largely unconstrained
beyond very general notions of the importance of the patent
document to the task of construction.
This Article is already too long, and so I will seek to close it
with a single observation. Much of the Federal Circuit's work with
respect to patent scope seems to depend heavily on the idea that the
substantive law defining patent invalidity, the doctrines of novelty,
nonobviousness, enablement, description, definiteness, etc., has the
power to substantially discipline patentee disclosure and claiming
strategies. There is little doubt that the law structurally reflects this
discipline. But if, for some reason, the disciplining force of these
doctrines is not strongly enough felt by patent applicants, the Federal
Circuit's innovations might not be fully effective.
For example, if competitors are regularly more passive with the
validity aspects of a patent suit than with the infringement aspects,"'
and this feature of patent litigation is systemically understood,
patentees might feel relatively confident using breadth and vagueness
in patent claims. At a systemic level, if the threat of invalidity for
overreaching or vague claims is not substantial, patent litigation
might increasingly concentrate on claim construction. The claims
involved, however, might be marginally more broad and vague, and
presented in the context of a patent specification that is marginally
less descriptive and less well aligned with the claims presented; but
that is also one the court has little choice but to rely heavily upon.
Thus, if the threat of invalidity is not "real" enough to encourage
patentees to draft closer to patentable claims, the Federal Circuit's
rules, while they can be understood as quite rationally adjusting
incentives in response to basic policies and theories of patent law
might not be working as well as we all might hope.
138. There are reasons patent competitors may be more passive here. The most apparent
reason is the presumption of validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). In addition, as was discussed
earlier, the measurement cost of obviousness is high, making validity challenges perhaps more
expensive than infringement challenges.
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